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1. Introduction 
With closer EU integration some economists and policy makers are worried that increased mobility of 
people, goods, and factors of production may release competitive forces leading to a roll back of social 
standards and welfare state arrangements. Countries have incentives to improve their relative position 
through successive undercutting of tax rates and welfare state arrangements, thereby attracting 
productive mobile production factors and deterring immigrants that impose a negative fiscal impact on 
the government budget.  
 
This relates to a large body of literature in public finance going back to Stigler (1957) and Musgrave 
(1959) that has warned against the consequences of decentralized responsibility for redistribution. The 
basic argument is that policies that are redistributive in nature give rise to a phenomenon that 
resembles adverse selection: net beneficiaries of redistributive policies are attracted to generous 
jurisdictions, while net contributors are repelled. It follows that jurisdictions have incentives to behave 
strategically in their welfare policy to avoid becoming ‘welfare magnets’. Because the concern about 
welfare migration limits welfare provision in all jurisdictions, no jurisdiction succeeds in repelling 
welfare recipients and the equilibrium is characterized by all jurisdictions setting lower benefits than 
they would in the (hypothetical) no-mobility case (Wildasin, 1991).1 Such reasoning has lead Stigler 
and other scholars to the conclusion that “redistribution is intrinsically a national policy” (Stigler, 
1957, p. 217). However, there are also potential benefits to reap from decentralized responsibility for 
redistribution, e.g. a decentralized system may be better to tailor (appropriate) benefits to those that are 
truly in need and in maintaining bureaucratic control.2 Theoretical models relying on different 
assumptions on the importance of welfare migration are likely to have different implications for 
assignment of redistributive policy across different tiers of government. Consequently, it is of interest 
to evaluate whether welfare migration is important in practice. This is the object of the current paper.  
 
To provide a proper test of the welfare migration hypothesis3, two key methodological issues must be 
addressed. First, unobserved omitted variables that are correlated with welfare policy may generate a 
spurious relationship between welfare policy and residential choices. Second, when policy making is 
                                                     
1 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’ in welfare policy. This term is somewhat misleading 
since theoretical models of fiscal competition typically do not suggest an intense race to the bottom, but a general downward 
pressure on redistributive activity. 
2 These and other aspects are discussed in detail by Ladd and Doolittle (1982).  
3 Do jurisdictions that offer higher welfare benefits attract poor people who would not otherwise move there and retain poor 
people who might otherwise have chosen to leave? 
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purposeful action, responsive to economic and political conditions, it is necessary to identify and 
control for the forces that lead to these policy changes (Besley and Case, 2000). If for example policy 
makers take into account the migration responses of welfare recipients when deciding on welfare 
policy, estimation based on cross-sectional variation in welfare policy will be biased. Utilizing a 
natural experiment, namely exogenous placement of refugees across Swedish municipalities, Dahlberg 
and Edmark (2004) find that policy makers respond to increases in the welfare population by reducing 
welfare benefits. This suggests that estimates based on the assumption that variation in welfare 
benefits is exogenous may underestimate the impact of welfare policy on net immigration. While the 
first problem is properly addressed in the more recent studies of welfare migration, the second 
problem is typically ignored. The current analysis addresses both issues. Besley and Case (2000) 
provide a general treatment and discussion of bias due to both omitted variables and policy 
endogeneity.  
 
The existing literature on the welfare migration hypothesis has studied data from the United States. 
The current analysis employs data from another country with decentralized welfare policy, Norway. 
The main contribution is to address the potential policy endogeneity by utilizing a centrally 
implemented policy reform as a natural experiment. More specifically, I use exogenous variation of 
changes in welfare benefits across Norwegian local governments provided by an announcement of 
national guidelines taking place in 2001. The econometric analysis applies a difference-in-differences 
strategy in which I evaluate whether changes in welfare benefits have a positive effect on changes in 
net inflow of welfare recipients relative to a control group. The results from the econometric analysis 
confirm the welfare migration hypothesis and suggest that ignoring the policy endogeneity may give 
rise to a downward bias in the estimated welfare migration effect.  
 
The early studies on the welfare migration hypothesis have provided conflicting results as to whether 
welfare recipients respond to (changes in) welfare benefit levels by relocating. These studies are 
however plagued by several methodological problems, discussed by, for example, Bailey (2005), 
McKinnish (2005), and Meyer (2000). Some of the very recent studies on the welfare migration 
hypothesis add to the welfare migration literature by applying more sophisticated identification 
strategies than previous studies and confirm the existence of welfare migration. Bailey (2005) stresses 
that many studies risk distorting the effect of welfare on migration decisions by inadequately 
accounting for attributes of the jurisdictions that affect migration. He demonstrates that some previous 
studies that failed to find any welfare migration effect suffer from omitted variable bias. Applying a 
more rigorous estimation strategy than many previous analyses, in particular by including state fixed 
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effects and a control group, he finds evidence of the welfare migration hypothesis. Gelbach (2004) 
points out that the incentives to migrate for welfare benefits in the United States are highest when a 
mother’s children are young, as there is a longer period of welfare benefit eligibility. He finds that for 
single women with less education than a college degree, their own state’s welfare benefits affect 
residential choices and that the effects were decreasing in the age of the oldest child. The interaction 
effect is not present for a comparison group of mothers with college degrees. McKinnish (2005, 2007) 
introduces another clever identification strategy. She compares welfare program size in border 
counties to interior counties within US states. The key assumption made is that costs of between-state 
migration are lower for individuals located close to state borders. It follows that at state borders with 
large cross-border benefit differential, the border counties on the high (low) benefit side should have 
higher (lower) welfare participation relative to the interior counties of the high (low) benefit state. This 
is exactly what McKinnish (2005) finds, utilizing aggregate county level data. Consistent results are 
found when micro level data on migration decisions are used (McKinnish, 2007).  
 
A related literature has focused on strategic interaction among jurisdictions in the determination of 
welfare policy, i.e. welfare competition. If a jurisdiction is concerned about becoming a ‘welfare 
magnet’, then benefit levels in other (typically close by) jurisdictions will affect the jurisdiction’s own 
benefit choice. Evidence of welfare competition thus provides indirect support to the welfare 
migration hypothesis. US studies, summarized by Brueckner (2000), and European studies, such as 
Fiva and Rattsø (2006) studying Norwegian local governments, find results consistent with the welfare 
competition hypothesis.4 Jurisdictions seem indeed to be playing a ‘welfare game’, suggesting that 
studies of welfare migration should pay close attention to policy endogeneity. Surprisingly, the 
existing literature does not follow this recommendation. Almost all existing studies rely purely on 
observed variation in welfare policy to identify welfare migration effects. However, if welfare policy 
affect residential decisions of the poor, then residential choices of the poor are likely to affect how 
benefit levels are set (Moffitt, 1992). If politicians respond to increased inflow of welfare recipients by 
lowering welfare benefits, a downward bias in studies that neglect this problem, such as Bailey (2005), 
Gelbach (2004), and McKinnish (2007), can be expected.5  
                                                     
4 Note that it is empirically challenging to separate strategic interaction in welfare policy due to mobility pressure from other 
sources of strategic interaction (notably yardstick competition). Revelli (2006) exploits an institutional reform taking place in 
the United Kingdom to address this issue. The results suggest that the spatial pattern observed in welfare policy is (at least 
partially) driven by yardstick competition. Revelli does not explicitly test the welfare migration hypothesis, but concludes 
based on a survey of 1500 households that “the mobility of the welfare beneficiaries of personal social services is likely to be 
rather low, virtually ruling out the race to the bottom hypothesis” (pp. 460-461). 
5 Policy endogeneity is less likely to be a problem for McKinnish (2005) since welfare migration effects are estimated by 
comparing welfare caseloads at state borders to state interiors, but this identification strategy only allows identification of 
short distance welfare migration effects. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the institutional setting and the data 
set. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and discusses potential problems with earlier work. 
Results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Institutional Structure and Data 
The welfare benefit system is the final safety net for those who fall through the gaps of other 
arrangements of the Norwegian welfare system and is intended to provide temporary support to people 
in need. The Social Service Act represents the regulations in force and states criteria and guidelines for 
the welfare benefits granted by local governments. The Social Service Act leaves considerable 
discretion to local governments concerning the generosity of the system, regarding both eligibility and 
the level of the benefits.  
 
The local governments are democratic institutions led by an elected local council. Their main 
responsibilities concern care for the elderly, preschool, primary and lower secondary education. 
Financing of local governments is highly centralized with around 90 percent of local government 
revenue coming from regulated income taxation and grants from the central government. Local 
governments have some discretion related to user charges and property taxation, which are important 
additional revenue sources on the margin. The grants are distributed as block grants and are based on 
objective criteria, partly as income tax equalization and partly as spending equalization. It follows that 
local governments do not face the full economic consequences of welfare migration.  
2.1. Welfare Benefits 
The implementation of welfare policies includes guidelines set by the local council and actual 
payments made by the local welfare office. The politically determined norms are defined as the 
amounts paid to ‘standard users’ per month. These are likely to be the most visible measure of welfare 
policy from the perspective of potential welfare immigrants and consequently appear well suited for a 
study of the welfare migration hypothesis. In this study I rely on the locally determined norms for a 
single-person household per month. 
 
Data on welfare benefit norms are available from 1993 and onwards. There are quite a few 
observations missing from the two first years of data collection, and consequently I limit the analysis 
to the period 1995 to 2004. A total of 435 Norwegian local governments existed between 1995 and 
2004. Due to a few missing variables and local government mergers I analyze a balanced panel of 430 
local governments in this analysis. The politically determined norm varies considerably across local 
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governments (see Appendix Table 1). Since housing costs are excluded from the politically 
determined norms, the observed variation in welfare benefits can hardly be attributed to differences in 
living costs. Nor can the variation in welfare benefits be explained by differences along other 
particular dimensions, such as differences between rural and urban local governments.6 The average 
welfare benefit norm to a single-person household was NOK 4203 (USD 700) per month in 2004. On 
average, the welfare benefits declined in real terms in the ten year period under study. The welfare 
competition mechanism, empirically identified by Fiva and Rattsø (2006), may have contributed to 
this.  
2.2. Migration Rates 
Data on received social assistance are available for the entire adult Norwegian population. In the 
current analysis I analyze migration patterns of single men aged 16 to 66, without dependent children 
living in the same household, approximately 400,000 individuals each year.7 This sample is further 
divided into two groups, welfare recipients and a control group of non-recipients. 
 
Although the basis for the analysis is micro data (described in detail in Appendix Table 3), I rely on 
net migration flows across local government lines in the econometric analysis. The key variables 
measure net inflow of welfare recipients and net inflow of nonrecipients respectively, scaled by local 
government population size in 10,000s. Descriptive statistics is provided in Table 1. Migration flows 
are measured from January 1st in year t to January 1st in year t+1. A person is defined as a welfare 
recipient if he received welfare benefits in year t, independent of whether he received welfare benefits 
in year t+1 (more on this in section 3.1). As a proxy for short distance migration flows I use migrations 
across local government lines within the same county, the regional level of government in Norway.8  
 
The econometric design elaborated in section 3 requires that the treatment and control group are as 
similar as possible (except for welfare migration incentives). This is the main reason for constraining 
the analysis to single men, aged 16 to 66, without dependent children. But there are also two other 
reasons for focusing on this group of people. First, welfare participation is very high among single 
men aged 16 to 66 without dependent children. This group constitute around one third of the entire 
                                                     
6 Using data for 1998, Fiva and Rattsø (2006) find no statistically significant association between welfare benefits and 
population size and settlement pattern, controlling for other factors. 
7 This paper is a revised version of a chapter in my PhD thesis (Fiva, 2006). In Fiva (2006) the inclusion criterion was more 
generous, including all men that at any point in time between 1992 and 2004, were single, aged 16 to 66 and without 
dependent children living in the same household. The results were similar.  
8 There are 18 counties in Norway in addition to Oslo which is both a county and a local government.  
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welfare recipient population, but below ten percent of the entire Norwegian population.9 Second, 
residential choices of this sub-population is unlikely to be sensitive to the other main local government 
services provided, primarily directed to children and elderly people, which may vary inversely with 
welfare policy. 10   
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on net migration flows, 1996-2004 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Net inflow of recipients -1.2 9.8 -172.1 62.0 3870 
Net inflow of nonrecipients -1.3 17.5 -137.4 87.7 3870 
Net inflow of recipients - Net inflow of nonrecipients 0.1 19.3 -194.3 155.7 3870 
Net inflow of recipients, from local governments 
within the same county -0.4 5.9 -61.0 42.9 3870 
Net inflow of nonrecipients, from local governments 
within the same county -0.1 11.0 -84.7 70.8 3870 
Net inflow of recipients - Net inflow of nonrecipients, 
from local governments within the same county -0.2 12.3 -76.7 84.7 3870 
Note: All variables are scaled by population size in 10,000s.  
 
Although social assistance is intended to be granted in emergency situations and not as long-term 
support, the micro data show that many recipients are dependent on welfare benefits for longer periods 
of time. Around 60 percent of the welfare recipients receive welfare benefits for more than three 
months within a given year and the majority of recipients that receive welfare in year t also received 
welfare in year t-1 and year t+1.  
 
Around 10 percent of the welfare recipient population moved across local government lines from one 
year to the next compared to around 5 percent of the control group of nonrecipients (see Appendix 
Table 3). Levine and Zimmerman, who also utilized US data to study the welfare migration 
hypothesis, distinguished between poor single mothers and four different control groups (poor single 
women without children, poor single men, poor married women, and poor married men). They find 
that “roughly 5–7.5% of the control group members are observed moving across state lines between 
one year and the next, compared to just under 4% of the treatment group members” (Levine and 
Zimmerman (1999, p. 401)).11 It follows that Norwegian single men without children receiving 
                                                     
9 The proportion of welfare recipients in the sub-population under study varies from 9.5 to 12.2 percent between 1996 and 
2004, while only 3 percent in the general population receive welfare benefits.  
10 The Norwegian Social Science Data Service provided the aggregate migration flows utilized in the current study. I have 
not had the opportunity to experiment with alternative treatment and control groups. 
11 Levine and Zimmerman (1999) found no evidence in favor of the welfare migration hypothesis. 
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welfare are close to three times as likely to move across jurisdiction lines with responsibility for 
welfare benefits as poor women with dependent children in the United States. The treatment group 
members (never-married high school dropouts with children) in the McKinnish (2007) study are even 
less mobile: only 5–6 percent of them moved across state lines during a five-year period. 12 
3. Empirical Strategy 
As stressed in the introduction, one has to address two key methodological challenges if one is 
interested in the causal effect of changes in welfare policy on residential choices of welfare recipients. 
First, unobserved factors that are correlated with welfare policy may generate a spurious relationship 
between welfare policy and residential choices (omitted variable problem). Second, since policy 
makers are likely to take into account the migration responses of welfare recipients when deciding on 
welfare policy, cross-sectional variation in changes in welfare benefits is endogenous to the migration 
responses (policy endogeneity). Both issues are addressed in the current study.  
3.1. The Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
A naïve test of the welfare migration hypothesis would be to investigate whether there is a positive 
correlation between welfare generosity and net inflow of recipients. However, since people move for 
any number of pecuniary or nonpecuniary reasons, any sensible model of welfare migration cannot 
rely on changes in welfare benefits as the sole determinant of migration. If for example regional 
economic shocks altered both migration patterns and welfare generosity, this would confound the 
estimates. In order to take account of such problems one can use migration patterns of similar people 
that are not welfare recipients. Introducing a valid control group allows me to take into account factors 
unrelated to welfare policy. The central idea is that welfare generosity will affect residential location 
of welfare recipients while leaving nonrecipients unaffected.  
 
On theoretical grounds, however, one cannot rule out that location decisions of nonrecipients also are 
affected by local government welfare policy. Welfare policy may have an impact on the residential 
choices of people in the control group if taxes are increased or if spending on other local services is 
reduced. The latter effect seems most worrisome in the Norwegian setting where local taxing power is 
limited. The main local services (child care, primary education and care for the elderly) are however 
unlikely to be important determinants of the residential choices of households in the control group.  
                                                     
12 Note that the average local government in Norway is much smaller in area than is the average US state. The average local 
government jurisdiction in Norway is approximately 700 km2, whereas the continental US states range from around 4,000 
km2 (Rhode Island) to almost 700,000 km2 (Texas). 
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To capture unobserved, time invariant local government effects I first-difference the model. 
Technically this yields a difference-in-differences approach, where the dependent variable measures 
changes in migration flows of welfare recipients (the treatment group) adjusted for changes in 
migration flows of nonrecipients (the control group). The main regression, where Δ denotes time 
differences, is given by: 
 
(1) 1 2 itBenefitsit itY uδ δ= + Δ +  
 
where Yit = Δnet inflow of recipientsit - Δnet inflow of nonrecipientsit. ΔBenefitsit is the change in the 
politically determined norm granted to a single person per month in NOK 1000 from year t–1 to year 
t.13 Migration rates are measured as net inflows from January 1st in year t to January 1st in year t+1. 
The dependent variable is scaled by local government population size (at beginning of year t) in 
10,000s. 2δ  can then be interpreted as an estimate of how many welfare recipients a local government 
with a population size of 10,000 (i.e. an average local government) receives if it increases welfare 
benefits with NOK 1000. The welfare migration hypothesis suggests that 2 0δ > .  
 
To reduce the possibility that endogenous welfare participation (correlation of welfare participation 
and welfare benefits) creates a spurious relationship between welfare policy and residential location I 
condition on welfare receipt in year t.14 I have also estimated the model, conditioning on welfare 
recipient status in year t+1, and the results are similar. This is comforting and suggests that 
endogenous welfare participation is not confounding the estimates. 
3.2. Policy Endogeneity 
If welfare-induced migration is a concern for policy makers, then ΔBenefits is endogenous to the left-
hand side variable in Eq. (1). If policy makers respond to an increasing welfare population by reducing 
welfare benefit levels, this results in a negative bias in 2δ  when estimating Eq. (1) with standard OLS. 
This problem is not properly addressed in the existing literature. While most studies simply ignore 
policy endogeneity, Peterson and Rom (1989) and Berry et al. (2003) aim to break the simultaneity 
                                                     
13 I have also experimented with utilizing the percentage change in welfare benefits as an independent variable. The results 
are then similar.  
14 If some people do not receive welfare payments in low-benefit states but would if they were in a high-benefit state, 
conditioning on welfare receipt in year t+1 is likely to exaggerate the flow of welfare recipients from low- to high-benefit 
jurisdictions. Conditioning on welfare receipt in period t would reduce the problem, but bias could still exist and would most 
likely go against finding evidence of welfare migration (Meyer, 2000). Conditioning on welfare receipt in period t is also 
likely to exhibit a downward bias if a substantial number of poor people who are not on welfare in period t (and are 
consequently assigned to the control group) migrate to other local governments to receive welfare benefits. 
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problem by estimating the mutual effects of welfare benefits and poverty rates, but the exclusion 
restrictions that they impose to obtain identification are questionable.15 Moreover, using poverty rates 
to estimate welfare migration effects is highly problematic since poverty rates within jurisdictions may 
change as a function of welfare policy without any migration taking place (due to disincentive effects 
or because welfare programs lift people out of poverty).  
 
Without the ability to experimentally vary the relevant variable (welfare generosity) this paper follows 
the recommendation of Meyer and seeks “variation that is driven by factors that are clearly identified 
and understood” (1995, p. 153). I suggest that the introduction of a national instructive welfare benefit 
norm in February 2001 can act as a natural experiment that allows me to obtain exogenous variation in 
ΔBenefits. The instructive norm was not a minimum standard, but aimed to “contribute to a more 
homogenous practice across local governments and to provide more similar support for equal 
recipients” (Circular I-13/2001 from the central government, my translation). Although it was not 
mandatory for the local governments to implement the national instructive welfare benefit norm, this 
reform had a large impact on local government priorities. In a survey conducted in August 2001, 104 
out of 336 local governments16 claimed that they had altered the welfare benefit levels after the 
national guidelines were announced. Of the local governments, 78 (19) claimed that they had changed 
their welfare benefits exclusively (partially) due to the announcement. In the current data set, 119 out 
of the 430 local governments chose to exactly implement the national instructive norm in 2001. 62 of 
these local governments were initially below the instructive national norm and 57 were initially above. 
The coefficient of variation in locally determined norms decreased from around 0.15 prior to the 
announcement to around 0.10 thereafter (see Appendix Table 1). The national guidelines seem to have 
succeeded in making the locally determined norms more homogenous.  
 
Utilizing the exogenous variation in ΔBenefits provided by this reform, a credible test of the welfare 
migration hypothesis can be conducted and potential bias on estimates that neglect policy endogeneity 
can be investigated.17 Because the policy reform was implemented at one point in time, this 
identification strategy reduces the data set from a panel data set of nine years of observations to a (first 
                                                     
15 Both studies exclude measures of government ideology, political competition, tax capacity and tax effort from the poverty 
rate equation. Berry et al. also exclude the federal share of costs of assisting particular welfare recipients. These studies 
provide conflicting evidence on the importance of policy endogeneity when estimating welfare migration effects. Peterson 
and Rom (1989) find that when welfare benefit levels increase, the size of the poverty population increases. But 
simultaneously, when poverty rates increase, benefit levels are cut. Berry et al. (2003) find only weak support for the welfare 
migration hypothesis and poverty rates do not seem to affect welfare policy. 
16 A total of 98 local governments did not respond.  
17 Meyer (1995) provides an insightful discussion of the issues surrounding natural experiments. 
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differenced) cross-section for 2001.18 Panel data prior to the policy reform are used to discuss possible 
bias caused by policy endogeneity.  
 
Since local governments chose whether or not to respond to the national guidelines, a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approach is warranted. To capture the impact of the national guidelines I rely on 
information on local governments’ welfare policy existing prior to the national guidelines. In my first 
stage regression, changes in welfare benefit levels from 2000 to 2001 (Δbenefits2001) are regressed on 
variables indicating the distance from the central guidelines (to be launched in 2001) in 2000: 
 
(2) i2001 0 1 2000 2 2000 3 2000 2000Benefits *i i i i iBelow Benefits Below Benefitsα α α α εΔ = + + + + , 
 
where below2000 is a dummy variable turned on if the local government had welfare benefits in 2000 
below the national instructive norm given in 2001 and benefits2000 is the benefit level in 2000. The 
interaction term (below2000*benefits2000) captures an asymmetric impact of the guidelines for local 
governments initially below rather than above the national instructive norm. The validity of this 
identification strategy rests on the assumption that local governments’ welfare benefit levels in 2000 
had no impact on the change in net inflows of welfare recipients (relative to the control group) in the 
following year, except through the impact on the change in welfare benefits.  
4. Results 
Looking into the Norwegian data on welfare policy and residential choices I start by providing a 
descriptive analysis of how the national guidelines may have affected overall migration rates. I then 
move on to the direct test of the welfare migration hypothesis, drawing on the identification strategy 
laid out in Section 3, before I discuss whether the estimated welfare migration effects are likely to be 
an important concern for policy makers. 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
The introduction of the national guidelines in 2001 was associated with a drop in the correlation of 
welfare benefit levels between two consecutive years (see Appendix Table 1). Based on the welfare 
migration hypothesis, average welfare migration incentives increase when several local governments 
                                                     
18 Appendix Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable for the 2001 cross section (corresponding to 
Table 1).   
13 
change their welfare benefits (for welfare recipients). This effect remains until the welfare recipient 
population has adjusted to the new welfare benefit levels.  
 
Interestingly, as Figure 1 shows, the proportion of welfare recipients that moved across local 
government lines peaked in 2001. The same finding holds when controlling for the migration rates of 
nonrecipients which should be unaffected by the ‘shock’ to welfare benefit levels. If welfare 
migrations typically are short distance moves one would expect that migration rates across local 
government lines within counties to be particularly sensitive to the centrally implemented policy 
reform. Figure 2, which emphasizes within-county migration flows, exhibits the same pattern as 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Share of households moving across local government borders 
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Figure 2. Share of households moving across local government borders within counties 
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To further investigate whether welfare recipients actually on average migrated more frequently 
following the implementation of the national instructive norms I evaluate within-county mobility in 
Norway’s 18 counties. Equation (3) shows the simple regression to be estimated: 
 
(3) (Mobility_Recipients -Mobility_NonRecipients ) 2001it it f di t itβ η= + + , 
 
where the dependent variable is the difference in within-county migration rates of welfare recipients 
and non-recipients, in county i at time t. On the right-hand side I include county specific fixed effects, 
if , and a time specific effect for year 2001 (d2001). Estimation of this specification shows that in 
comparison to other years, the difference in migration rates between recipients and nonrecipients 
within counties were on average 0.5 percentage points higher in 2001. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level and holds when studying either the entire period available 
(specification 1) or only the period up to the reform (specification 2), and when the lagged 
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unemployment rate is included as an explanatory variable (specification 3 and 4).19 This is suggestive 
evidence in favor of the welfare migration hypothesis.  
 
Table 2.  A 2001-effect on within county migration rates? The dependent variable is 
it it(Mobility_Recipients -Mobility_NonRecipients )   
  1 2 3 4 
  Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error 
D2001 0.0048 0.0016 0.0055 0.0015 0.0042 0.0016 0.0045 0.0015 
Unemployment (–1)         -0.2030 0.1138 -0.3728 0.1185 
R2 0.58 0.62 0.59 0.66 
Number of observations 162 108 162 108 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1996-2004 1996-2001 1996-2004 1996-2001 
 
4.2. The Direct Test of the Welfare Migration Hypothesis 
As discussed above, one needs variation in welfare policy that reasonably can be treated as exogenous 
to identify welfare migration effects. The empirical strategy followed here is to utilize variation in 
changes in welfare benefits generated by the introduction of national guidelines launched in 2001. The 
first-stage regression is reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. First-stage regression: The dependent variable is ΔBenefits 
 5 
 Coeff. St. error 
Constant 0.719 0.194 
Below 1.192 0.371 
Benefits (2000) -0.189 0.043 
Benefits (2000) * Below -0.296 0.099 
R2 0.275 
Number of observations 430 
Sample 2001 
Estimation method OLS 
 
The first stage F-statistic for the joint null hypothesis of zero coefficients on all excluded instruments 
shows that the instruments are strong (with an F-statistic of 53.75). As expected, local governments 
                                                     
19 Time dummies for other years all come out statistically insignificant, except the dummy for 2004 (which has a positive 
sign), when including them one at a time.  
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with welfare benefits below the central guidelines for 2001 are predicted to have increased their 
welfare benefits from 2000 to 2001, and to a greater extent the further they were from the central 
guidelines. The local governments above the central guidelines were predicted to reduce their welfare 
benefits and to a greater extent the further they were from the central guidelines. However, the effect 
is not symmetric for local governments above and below the guidelines. Local governments above the 
central guidelines seem to have been less inclined to conform to the national guidelines than those 
below the central guidelines. A local government NOK 500 below the national guidelines is predicted 
to increase their welfare benefits with NOK 270, while a local government NOK 500 above the 
national guidelines is predicted to reduce their welfare benefits with NOK 109.  
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 plots respectively predicted and actual changes in welfare benefits from 2000 to 
2001 against welfare benefit levels in 2000. The downward sloping line that can be spotted in Figure 4 
corresponds to the 119 local governments that chose to exactly implement the national instructive 
norm. For comparison, Appendix Figure 1 shows corresponding figures for 1996-2000. 
 
Figure 3.  Predicted changes in welfare benefit levels from the first-stage regression (vertical 
axis) against welfare benefit levels in 2000 (horizontal axis). Welfare benefit levels are 
measured in 1000 NOK 
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Figure 4.  Actual changes in welfare benefit levels from 2000 to 2001 (vertical axis) against 
welfare benefit levels in 2000 (horizontal axis). Welfare benefit levels are measured in 
1000 NOK 
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The main results are presented in Table 4. As a benchmark for evaluating the potential policy 
endogeneity problem I include results from OLS regressions on Eq. (1) based on panel data for the 
period prior to the introduction of the central guidelines (1996–2000). In this sample no welfare 
migration effect can be found, evaluating overall migration flows (specification 6) or only short 
distance migration flows (specification 7). Short distance moves are defined as migrations across local 
government lines within counties.  
 
When constraining the sample to the (first differenced) cross- section when the central guidelines were 
launched and replacing actual values for ΔBenefits with fitted values from the first-stage regression, I 
find economically important welfare migration effects. A NOK 1000 increase in welfare benefits is 
estimated to lead to a net inflow of around 10 welfare recipients from the population under study the 
following year (for a local government with a population of 10,000).  
 
Even though long distance migrations constitute around 60 percent of all migrations, I find similar 
point estimates when evaluating all migration flows and only within county migration flows. While 
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the latter estimate is close to statistically significant at the 1 percent level, the former is only borderline 
significant at the 10 percent level.20 This suggests that most, if not the entire, welfare migration effect 
is driven by welfare recipients migrating between jurisdictions that are geographically close. 
Moreover, a comparison of OLS and 2SLS specifications suggests that there seems to be a downward 
bias in estimates that ignore policy endogeneity.  
 
Table 4.  Second-stage regressions: The dependent variable is (Δnet inflow of recipientsit -  Δnet 
inflow of nonrecipientsit) 
  6 7 8 9 
  Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error 
Δbenefits 0.436 1.763 1.223 1.255 9.250 5.899 11.344 4.458 
Number of observations 2150 2150 430 430 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
1996–2000 1996–2000 2001 2001 
Sample 
All Within county All Within county 
Estimation method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Note: A constant term is included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust to unknown 
forms of heteroscedasticity and clustered at the local government level (specification 6 and 7). 
 
The central idea in the difference-in-differences estimator is that, except for welfare migration 
incentives, do control and treatment group members face the same migration incentives. However, to 
capture that changes in economic conditions do not necessarily influence treatment and comparison 
groups in the same way, and minimize the risk of getting an omitted variable bias, I have included 
Δunemployment as a control variable. Unemployment is defined as the share of the male population 
that is unemployed (yearly average). This variable captures the differential effect of changes in 
unemployment rates on the treatment and control population. Utilizing US data, Bailey (2005) finds 
that the welfare population is less repelled by high unemployment. In the current data set I do not find 
an impact of the lagged unemployment rate and the effect of changes in welfare benefits is unaltered 
when this variable is included, reported in Table 5.  
 
                                                     
20 A more parsimonious first-stage specification where the only IV is benefits(2000) yields a somewhat lower fit of the first-
stage regression (R2 of 0.253). The point estimates are similar: 10.993 (6.319) and 12.157 (4.746) corresponding to 
specification 8 and 9 (standard errors within brackets). If only ‘below’ is used as an instrument the first stage regression 
yields an R2 of 0.192 and corresponding point estimates of 6.763 (7.835) and 10.164 (5.255).  
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Table 5. Second-stage regressions: The dependent variable is (Δnet inflow of recipientsit -  Δnet 
inflow of nonrecipientsit), change in unemployment included as a control variable 
  10 11 12 13 
  Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error 
Δbenefits 1.580 2.355 1.264 1.257 9.255 5.920 11.352 4.464 
Δunemployment 0.399 1.772 -0.892 1.083 0.676 5.662 -0.167 3.752 
Number of observations 2150 2150 430 430 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
1996–2000 1996–2000 2001 2001 
Sample 
All Within county All Within county 
Estimation method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Note: A constant term is included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust to unknown forms of 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the local government level (specification 10 and 11). 
 
Increasing welfare benefits have two effects on migration flows: attracting people from other local 
governments and retaining the welfare population that is already living in the local government area. 
Reductions in welfare benefits will work oppositely. The repelling and attracting forces may not 
necessarily be symmetric and may also manifest over different time spans. I have investigated whether 
the repelling effect is stronger than the attracting effect (or vice versa) but I have not found such an 
asymmetric welfare migration effect in the data. Moreover, since I only evaluate migration flows from 
one year to the next, it is reasonable to believe that I only capture the short term and not the full 
welfare migration effect.  
 
In Appendix Table 4 and 5 I report OLS (first differenced) cross-section regressions for each year. The 
estimated welfare migration effects exhibit considerable variation from year to year. Interestingly, the 
cross-section regression for 2001 is the only regression with a positive and statistically significant 
welfare migration effect for estimates based on both overall and short distance migration flows.21 One 
possible interpretation of this finding is that the bias in the OLS estimates due to policy endogeneity is 
smaller in the 2001 cross- section because many local governments mechanically adjusted their 
welfare benefit levels in line with the national instructive guidelines from 2000 to 2001.  
4.3. Is Welfare Migration Likely to be a Concern for Policy Makers? 
The results above show that changes in welfare benefits exert a nontrivial effect on residential choices 
of welfare recipients. However, one may question whether this migratory response is perceived by 
                                                     
21 The welfare migration estimate is positive and statistically significant for the 1999 cross- section when overall migration 
flows are evaluated. 
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local policy makers and whether policy makers react by holding benefit levels below what they 
otherwise would be. Gelbach (2004) and McKinnish (2007) argue that this is probably not the case. 
Although they find that differences in welfare generosity generate substantial changes in the migration 
rates of welfare-prone households, they argue that even sizeable differences in migration rates do not 
generate particularly large migration flows because welfare-prone individuals in the United States are 
a relatively immobile group. They conclude that welfare migration is unlikely to be a large concern of 
policy makers. The main findings of the current analysis stand in contrast to this conclusion. If welfare 
migration had no impact on the political decision making process, the standard OLS estimates 
presented above would not be biased.  
 
To see why policy makers are likely to worry about welfare magnetism, consider the following 
stylized example based on the results presented above. An average local government consisting of 
10,000 inhabitants and 3 percent welfare recipients considers increasing its welfare benefits from 
NOK 4000 to NOK 4500 for all types of welfare recipients. In the no-mobility case, the cost of such a 
policy would simply be the increase in welfare benefits times the number of recipients living in the 
jurisdiction (NOK500*300 = NOK150,000). However when welfare recipients respond to changes in 
welfare benefits by relocating, the cost of welfare generosity increases because the jurisdictions’ 
welfare recipient population increases. According to specification 9, a NOK 500 increase would lead 
to a net inflow of approximately six welfare recipients from the subpopulation under study the 
following year (0.5*11.34), corresponding to around 6 percent increase in the welfare recipient 
population under study.  
 
In the data set (constrained to migration flows of single men aged 16-66 without dependent children) I 
cannot test whether the welfare migration responses are equally strong for other welfare recipient 
groups (single women, families, etc.). Assuming that such households react in similar fashion to 
changes in welfare benefit levels as the welfare recipient population studied here, the cost of 
increasing welfare benefits with NOK 500 become: NOK 500*300 current recipients + NOK 4500*18 
new recipients = NOK 231,000 per month. The cost is 54 percent higher than if welfare recipients do 
not respond to changes in welfare benefits. This back-of-the-envelope calculation exaggerates the 
welfare migration cost if, for example, households with children respond less to changes in welfare 
benefits than single-person households. However, assuming that the migration response of all other 
households except single men, 16 to 66 years old, without dependent children is equal to zero still 
suggests that the cost of increasing welfare benefits from NOK 4000 to NOK 4500 is 18 percent 
higher than it would be in the absence of welfare migration.  
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Although the confidence interval of the estimate driving this result admittedly is quite large, the results 
in this analysis suggest that welfare migration is likely to be a concern for policy makers. This is 
consistent with the strong strategic interaction in welfare policy found among Norwegian local 
governments by Fiva and Rattsø (2006). 
5. Conclusion 
The current analysis exploits a natural experiment to investigate the welfare migration hypothesis and 
finds supportive evidence. In particular, there seems to be a downward bias in estimates that ignores 
policy endogeneity. The welfare migration responses are of a magnitude that suggests that policy 
makers are likely to worry about ‘welfare magnetism’ and fiscal competition in welfare policy is likely 
to prevail. As is well known from the theoretical literature, this may result in an equilibrium 
characterized by suboptimal levels of redistribution. Although this is not necessarily the case in 
Norway (due to the centralized financing of the local governments), this paper suggests that the main 
argument against decentralized responsibility for redistribution is not merely a theoretical possibility. 
Rather this argument seems highly relevant in settings similar to the one analyzed by the current 
paper. The importance of welfare migration in settings where household mobility is lower than across 
local government borders in Norway, such as between European countries, is a topic that should be 
addressed in future research.  
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